Abstract This paper shows that abnormal stock price returns around the date of open market repurchase announcements are four times higher in Germany than in the USA (12 ver. 3%). We hypothesize that this observation can be explained by national differences in repurchase regulations. Our empirical evidence indicates that German managers primarily buy back shares to signal an undervaluation of their firm. We demonstrate that the stringent repurchase process prescribed by German law attributes a higher credibility to undervaluation signals than do the lax US regulations, and thereby corroborates our hypothesis.
Introduction
In May 1998 the "Corporation Control and Transparency Act" (KonTraG) abolished the legislation restricting share repurchasing in Germany. In the The new German laws on share repurchase programs differ in important aspects from the laws and regulations that govern share repurchase transactions in the USA. For example, managers of German firms must first obtain approval for a share repurchase program at their annual shareholder meeting and then publicly announce the share repurchase. Management must then give a full statement at the next shareholder meeting on the reasons for the transaction, its volume, and the price paid per share. In contrast, US firms need only obtain approval from their company board and must publicly announce the establishment of a repurchase program. They do not have to disclose the details of any actual repurchase transactions either to the authorities or to their shareholders. The existing empirical literature on US open market share repurchases cited below provides strong evidence that many US firms announce repurchase programs to convey their assessment to investors that their shares are undervalued. A change in disclosure requirements would perhaps affect the quality of such a signal and thus have an effect on the motivation of firms to engage in share repurchases. An empirical analysis of share repurchases in Germany therefore promises to provide new insights into the role of specific legal provisions in instigating corporate insiders to successfully disseminate private information to capital markets. This paper proceeds from this general conjecture and pursues two goals. In order to find out whether German share repurchase announcements have a market impact different from the repurchase announcements in other countries, we measure the abnormal share price effects around the two major publicly observable events in the context of share repurchases in Germany, namely a firm's initial voluntary statement to seek shareholder approval and the subsequent obligatory announcement to begin share repurchasing. We then test four popular hypotheses on why managers repurchase shares and thereby investigate whether motivations of German firms differ systematically from the motivations of their US counterparts. Our main empirical finding is that although both German and US firms seem primarily to repurchase shares in order to signal that their firm is undervalued, announcement price effects tend to be considerably greater in Germany than in the USA. We discuss three possible explanations for this observation and conclude that German repurchase regulations are stricter than US regulations and therefore provide a more powerful signaling tool.
The paper unfolds as follows: the next section describes the German legal framework governing repurchase programs and compares this framework to US regulations. Section 3 briefly reviews the empirical literature on repurchase transactions in various countries. Section 4 presents the dataset, and Sect. 5 describes the methodology. Section 6 reports and discusses the empirical results. The last section summarizes the paper and concludes with a side note to regulators. Throughout the paper we concentrate on open market programs because they have been by far the most popular vehicle in Germany.
